ETHGlobal · Oct 9, 2024

What happens when the MEV supply chain starts to break apart? In this insightful panel from Pragma Istanbul 2023, industry leaders dive into the evolving architecture of Ethereum’s transaction pipeline. Tarun Chitra (Gauntlet), Anna George (CoW Protocol), Wee Howe Ang (Tokka Labs), Kubi Mensah (Titan Builder), and Tina Zhen (Flashbots) unpack the future of block building, solver strategy, Searcher competition, and the rise of intent-based systems. The discussion explores whether intents are just glorified limit orders, how solvers differ from Searchers, the implications of builder verticalization, and whether block building itself will remain viable as solvers get smarter. Panelists reflect on the disaggregation trend post-PBS, what incentives are shifting as rollups and L2s mature, and how application-specific use cases are rewriting the rules of MEV extraction and mitigation. With opinions on decentralization, user experience, fair ordering, and technical bottlenecks, this is essential viewing for anyone working at the intersection of Ethereum infrastructure, MEV, and application-layer design. 00:00 Intro & panel context 00:52 MEV stack intros & 2023 surprises 06:30 Solvers vs Searchers clarified 08:39 Order flow auction mechanics 10:59 What defines a block builder 12:04 TradFi parallels in MEV roles 13:40 Market maker integration in building 14:54 MEV history: From spam to PBS 16:37 Disaggregation of the supply chain 17:18 Why intents are gaining traction 19:25 UX and inefficiencies in DeFi 21:19 Comeback of RFQs and private liquidity 23:36 POS economics & proposer yield 24:24 What is an intent (beyond limit orders)? 27:07 Non-financialized intent examples 28:35 Will intents centralize like PBS? 30:37 Can specialized solvers survive oligopoly? 33:26 Solvers vs Builders and user outcomes 36:59 Rollups, shared sequencers, and inclusion 38:12 Specialization and niche opportunities 40:45 Can coordinated specialists outcompete integrated Builders? 42:30 Strategy-driven specialization 44:43 Competitive pressure from Uniswap & aggregators 46:22 Should Builders accept exclusive order flow deals? 48:40 Who gets squeezed first—Builders or solvers? 50:11 Top 3 long-term Builder success factors 51:09 Outro & closing remarks _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 🇹🇷 *Pragma Istanbul* The sixth edition of Pragma took place in Istanbul in November 2023 with a curated series of high-quality talks that sparked thought and discussion. Pragma Istanbul 2023 was an opportunity discuss the future of web3 and reflect on the past. Watch the full Pragma Istanbul 2023 playlist here: https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLXzKMXK2aHh4rHV1H4J7y0wDok4bIS17t&si=lb8ttkU1HS2tpnUP ETHGlobal's Pragma series takes place in cities around the world, and is designed to be a different kind of event. Pragma is a one-stage conference with founders-only on stage, bringing together a small group of curated attendees and speakers to discuss the future of web3 and reflect on the past. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ✅ Follow *ETHGlobal* X: https://x.com/ETHGlobal​ Warpcast: https://warpcast.com/ethglobal Website: https://ethglobal.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/ETHGlobal _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Are you interested in Ethereum development and entrepreneurship?_ 👉 Sign up for the next ETHGlobal event: https://ethglobal.com/events 🎁 Get exclusive access and perks with ETHGlobal Plus! https://ethglobal.com/plus 📣 Want us to throw an event in your city? Tell us where! https://ethglobal.com/city _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ZuBerlin · Jun 13, 2024

Clip The video discusses three philosophies of mitigating maximal extractable value (MEV) and their implications for blockchain design, particularly in terms of transaction ordering policies. The first philosophy emphasizes blockchains as incentive engines, focusing on proposer incentives for healthy block production. The second views blockchains as timestamping services, prioritizing first-in, first-out (FIFO) transaction ordering to reflect real-world time. The third treats blockchains as auction platforms, ensuring fair and decentralized auctions through priority ordering. Each philosophy leads to different MEV mitigation strategies. Proposal builder separation (PBS) aligns the block proposer with users and applications to create value-maximizing blocks. FIFO aims to reduce MEV by minimizing latency and discretion in transaction ordering. Priority ordering mitigates MEV through fair auctions that allow users and applications to capture MEV themselves. The video further explores how these philosophies are implemented in current blockchain systems and the challenges they pose in achieving decentralization while mitigating MEV effectively. It concludes that while no single philosophy has all the answers, it's crucial to consider how improvements under one paradigm may affect the others when making protocol changes.